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Thirty years ago, Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote that the
interest of the Government "in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." We must
ask ourselves today whether justice is being done in American
courts and American society to the very large number of citizens
who cannot afford to defend themselves against criminal chargesor against society.
Criminal justice is a subject that ought to be of primary
concern to all working in the law, and yet it has become the
neglected stepchild of legal practice. I believe a deep and
general resurgence of interest in criminal justice is needed today.
The legal profession, which proclaims that rich and poor are
equal in the eyes of the law, must act better to translate that
rhetoric into reality.
There are deep stirrings of such a resurgence, prompted in
large part by the Supreme Court's decision last year in Gideon v.
Wainwright, which resulted in Clarence Earl Gideon's subsequent re-trial and acquittal after two years in prison. The impact
of the Gideon decision has been to suggest that appointed counsel
for indigent defendants will now be required in all courts, state
as well as federal-that all courts now will have to face the
problems with which federal courts have been dealing for years.
We should ask, why was it necessary for there to be a
Gideon case in the first place? The principle it established is
central in the law. The same result should have been present
long ago, springing from our consciences rather than our courts.
But now the principle has been enunciated and our present need
is to see that the momentum for equal justice is maintained and
developed into those reforms for which just and thoughtful men
have been calling for decades.
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The appointment of an attorney for an indigent defendant,
after all, is a mere starting point. The question presented immediately is whether such an appointment alone provides fair
representation. Our experience in federal and state courts demonstrates that it does not. As the law now stands, court-appointed
defense attorneys receive no investigative or expert help. They
often are not appointed soon enough, with the result that the
trail of evidence and witnesses is muddy or missing. Those
appointed often lack trial experience, and, even if they have it,
they receive no pay for their services, not even reimbursement
for out-of-pocket expenses.
These conditions impose a dual hardship, first on lawyers
and then, inevitably, on the indigents they represent. Every
judicial district provides its own illustrations:
-One Virginia attorney, for example, was required to serve
in a case for 18 continuous days, including seven night sessions,
in defense of an indigent defendant charged with a federal liquor
tax violation. He received not a cent for his efforts.
-A young Salem, Oregon, attorney was appointed to defend
a mail fraud case on the day of his admission to the bar of the
federal court. The trial alone-preparation time aside-took 11
weeks. The young lawyer was employed by two attorneys who
consequently had to hire someone else for the period, at a cost
of $2,300.
-In Detroit, a 25-year-old attorney was appointed to a case
which took 10 weeks to try. He was not, however, associated
with a firm which could support him in the process, and had
just opened his own office. By the end of the 10 weeks, he had
to spend Saturdays and Sundays selling real estate to try to cover
his office expenses.
A system which regularly makes such demands of lawyers is
unfair to the legal profession. What should be of even greater
concern is that such a system inevitably is unjust to those poor
defendants whom the system is intended to benefit. The final
result of this system, despite the dedication of many conscientious
individual attorneys, is that poor defendants stand less chance of
obtaining full justice than do defendants with means.
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Several recent studies have demonstrated that defendants
with appointed counsel enter guilty pleas much more frequently.
They stand less chance of getting the charges against them dismissed. If they go to trial, they have less chance of acquittal.
And if convicted, they have less chance of securing probation
rather than prison terms. We are not talking about a handful
of defendants. In the federal system alone, 10,000 defendants
have court-appointed counsel. This is nearly one-third of the
total.
Because of our great concern over these difficulties, I appointed a committee three years ago, headed by Professor Francis
A. Allen of the University of Chicago Law School, to investigate
the problems faced by the poor in federal courts. After two
years of detailed analysis, the Allen Committee submitted an
outstanding report. As the result of its recommendations, legislation is now pending in Congress to help us restore the balance
of the scales.
Corrective legislation has been before the Congress since
1939 and although several bills passed the Senate, none was
approved by the House until this session. In early 1963, President
Kennedy sent to Congress the proposed Criminal Justice Act of
1963, based in large part on the Allen Committee report. The
measure was passed by the Senate last August. In January of'
this year, the House took favorable action for the first time,
though with significant departures from the Senate bill. Thus,
a measure soon could be enacted, following a conference of the
two chambers.
As introduced, the Criminal Justice bill would provide that
court appointed defense attorneys be paid for their services, and
it would permit each federal judicial district and circuit to choose
the most suitable plan for appointing a defense counsel. There
would be four choices: private attorneys, a public defender, local
legal aid societies and defender organizations, or any combination
of those three.
In its definition of "adequate defense," the bill includes whatever auxiliary services are required in preparing a sound casethe use of investigators, experts, and other special witnesses. It
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also would provide that counsel be guaranteed at every stage of
the proceedings, from the time of a defendant's first appearance
before a commissioner. Finally, it avoids the term "indigent"
and provides for assistance to all persons unable to afford an
adequate defense-thus aiding the man who may be able to pay
part but not all of his legal fees.
The enactment of this legislation would be a significant step
forward, but it would only be a step and, in any event, a step
only in federal courts. A great deal more needs to be done and
federal interest or legislation alone cannot do it.
The obvious next step would be similar legislation in the
various states, where unpaid court-appointments could result in
just as heavy burdens on lawyers and defendants as they have
in the federal system of unpaid representation so far.
Of parallel injustice and parallel importance is the whole
broad question of bail, which also was explored by the Allen
Committee and by the National Conference on Bail and Criminal
Justice in Washington this spring.
The historic purpose of bail has been to insure the presence
of the accused at trial. Recent studies demonstrate, however, that
there is little, if any, relationship between appearance at trial and
ability to post bail. A current experiment in New York City, the
Manhattan Bail Project, undertaken by the Vera Foundation, discloses that of 2,400 defendants released on their own recognizance, only 19-less than 1 percent-failed to appear. This percentage is at least as small as that for persons who jump bail.
Thus, in New York City at least, the philosophy of financial
bail is plainly outmoded. It is also grossly unjust. Because he is
forced to remain in jail pending trial, the man unable to afford
bail is subjected to emotional scars and a record as a "jailbird,"
irrespective of his guilt. While he is in jail, he is unable to assist
in securing the witnesses or evidence for his defense, even though
he is often the person best able to do so. By remaining in jail and
thus losing time at work-or more likely his job-his poverty is
compounded.
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A dramatic aspect of the problem is that of young adults

accused of crime. They usually lack the kind of money necessary
even to buy a bail bond. Their resulting pre-trial imprisonment
often throws them into the company of hardened criminals. This
time in jail-prior to trial-is equivalent, in the words of Justice
Douglas, "to an M.A. degree in crime."
The literal injustice is evident from statistics compiled by
the Manhattan Bail Project. Of the first 1,214 persons released
on their own recognizance in' the experiment, 620 either were
acquitted or had their cases dismissed. Of the 590 who were
convicted, 415 received suspended sentences. And 120 others paid
fines in lieu of prison terms. The rest, 65 persons, ultimately
went to jail-5 percent of the original 1,214 defendants. Save for
the experiment, the other 95 percent would have had to go to
jail in lieu of bail. The lesson of this experiment for the bail
system is evident.
We have sought to respond to such injustice at the federal
level. In March, 1963, I instructed all United States Attorneys to
recommend the release of defendants on their own recognizance
when no substantial risk was involved. This policy has been
followed throughout the country, without problem.
The National Bail Conference is a joint effort to seek reform at the state and local level as well, bringing together hundreds of judges, attorneys, bondsmen, law enforcement officers
and other experts from all over the country. But no conference,
no matter how many experts are involved, can conquer the
problem, any more than federal legislation providing for -an
adequate, compensated defense for federal prisoners can solve
the nationwide representation problem.
These are problems that require the wholehearted involvement of the legal profession, starting with law students and
reaching to the topmost ranks of our largest law firms. As
we see ourselves as leaders in the arena of public affairs, as officers of our courts, and as agents of justice, so it is our clear
responsibility to work for solution to these problems, starting
at the community level.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REv Ew

[Vol. 5:167

And even this kind of involvement is narrow and superficial.
We, as a profession, have a responsibility for a larger social
effort on behalf of the poor. We have not fulfilled this larger
responsibility. Indeed, we have not even recognized it. We
secure the acquittal of a poor man only then to abandon him to
a world of eviction notices, wage attachments, repossessiofi of his
automobile, or termination of his welfare benefits.
That world is one for which the poor have scant equipment.
To the poor man, "legal" has become a synonym not for that
which is to be respected, but simply for technicality and obstruction.
What is our responsibility toward the general problems
which stem from poverty, and not only those which may surface
in the form of crime? What is our responsibility concerning that
phenomenon of massive privation to which our nation is now, at
last, awakening? First, lawyers must bear responsibility for permitting the development of two systems of law, one for the rich
and another for the poor. Without a lawyer, what is the benefit
of an administrative review procedure in a welfare program?
Without a lawyer, what is the effect of the right to a refund of
payments already made on a repossessed car? The point, simply,
is that unasserted, unknown, unavailable rights are no rights at
all.
Too often, the fundamental spirit of the poor is helplessness.
It does not stem from the absence of theoretical rights. But it
can stem from an inability to assert real rights. It seems to me
that the legal profession has a special responsibility to help citizens at all levels to assert those rights. We can begin to do so
by practicing law on behalf of the poor. Some of the necessary
jobs are not very different from what lawyers do all the time
for those who can pay-and well. The problems may be more
difficult, but they involve essentially the same skills. The fees
are less; the rewards are greater. Just as the corporate lawyer
seeks to guide company policy away from an anti-trust or a
fraud violation, so too can the individual be giided regarding
leases, installment purchases, or any of the variety of common
dealings under which he can be exploited.
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To some extent, this is the kind of assistance legal aid societies
can provide. But the job is not going to be done simply by
creating or supporting such agencies. The job takes more than an
annual check of $100 or even $1,000. It requires the combined
commitment of our intellectual and our ethical energies to donate,
not once or twice but continuously, the resources of our profession. Why should not large law firms assign attorneys to work
in this area, perhaps on a rotating basis? Why should not more
law students spend summers helping attorneys in indigent cases,
working with juvenile delinquency programs or in settlement
houses? The range of methods by which we can accept our
responsibility and meet these problems is as diverse as the number of communities in which the problems exist.
Last October, President Kennedy said at Amherst College:
"There is inherited wealth in this country and also inherited poverty. And unless the graduates of this college
and other colleges like it who are given a running start in
life-unless they are willing to put back into our society
those talents, the broad sympathy, the understanding, the
compassion-unless they are willing to put those qualities
back into the service of the Great Republic, then obviously
the presuppositions upon which our democracy are based are
bound to be fallible."
Our profession has a particular responsibility to prove those
presuppositions. Our professional obligation extends to championing the presumption of individual sanctity of all citizens,
rich and poor alike. This obligation stems from our system,
from the rule of law, and, above all, from justice.

